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Introduction
In one-machine sequencing situations each agent (player) has one job that has to be ptocessed on a single machine. Each job is specified by its ready time, the earliest time that the processing of the job can begin, and its processing time, the time the machine takes to handle the job. We assume that the costs of a player depend linearly on the completion time of his job. Furthermore, there is an initial order on the jobs of the agents before the processing of the machine starts.
A group oí agents (a coalition) can save costs by rearranging their jobs in a way that is admissible with respect to the various ready times and the initial order. By defining the value of a coalition as the maximum cost savings a coalition can make in this way, we obtain a cooperative sequencing game related to a one-machine sequencing situation.
The formal model can be found in section 'l.
'he above gatne theoretic approach was introduced by Curirl, Pedr.rzoli and Tijs (1989) . They showed convexity for all sequencing games arising from one-machine se- In section 3 we consider some properties oí this special class of one-machine sequencing situations. By modifying an algorithm of Rinnooy Kan (1976J one easily determines the optimal order of any coalition in these sequencing situations. However, this algorithm does not immediaiely describe the relation between optimal orders of various subcoalitions. Some of these relations are provided in section 3.
5equencing situations
In a one-machine sequencing situation there is a queue of agents, each with one job, before a machine (counter). Each agent (player) has to process his job on the machine.
The finite set oí agents is denoted by N and~N~-n.
By a bijcction o: N~{ 1, ..., n} we can describc the poeition of the agents in the queuc.
Specifically, o(i) -j means that player i is in position j.
The ready time r; of the job of agent ti is the earliest time the processing of this job can begin. The processing time p; of the job of agent i is the time the machine takes to handle this job.
We assume that every agent has a affine cost function c; :[o,oo)~R defined by c;(t) -~it f-ai with a;~o, ai E R.
Further it is assumed that there is an initial order oo : N~{1,...,n} on the jobs of the players before the processing of the machine starta with the property that for all i, j E N with oo(i) G oa(j) it holds that r; C ri. A sequencing situation as described Hence, the completion time of the job of agent i is equal to C(o, i) :-t; , f p;. The total costs c,(S) oí a coalition S C N, is given by
For notational convenience let P(i) :-P(oo, i) and F(i) :-F(vo, i).

Co(S)~-~a;(C(~, z)) } I-~i. iES
The (maximal) costsavings of a coalition S depend on the set of admisaible reatrangements of this coalition. We call a bijection v: N~{1,...,n} admiasible for S if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) the starting time of each agent outside the coalition S is equal to his atarting time in the initial order: t;,,o -t;,o for all i E N`S.
(ii) the agents of S are not allowed to jump over playera outaide S:
The set oí admissible rearrangements for a coalition S is denoted by ES .
Before formally introducing sequencing games we recall some well known facts wncerning cooperatives games.
A cooperative game is a pair (N,v) where N is a finite set of players and v is a mapping at each time t E{0, 1,...} all jobs are considercYl that are available at rnoment t, i.e. the joba that are not processed before t and that havc a ready time smaller than or equal to t.
A game (N, v) is called convex if for all coalitions S,T E 2N it holds that
The job with the highest urgency of all available jobs at t will be processed at that time.
If there is more then one available job at t with the highest urgency, we pick the one with the smallest index number. Note that the set of available jobs at a given time can be empty. The algorithm stops when all jobs are assigned a position. A similar procedure can be applied to find an optimal rearrangement às for an arbitrary coalition S with components Sr,...,S"r 1 1 such that min{oo(j)~j E Sr} G... G min{ao(j)~j E S,}. To illustrate the algorithm we give the following example. For notational convenience we denote a bijection v: N-a {1,...,n} by a n-dimensional vector (il,...,i") with {il,...,i"} -N where ik denotes the player that is assigned to position k. Second we give the optimal order of S-{2, 3, 5, 6}. Obviously we have that QS(1) -1 and QS(4) -4 and it is sufficient to rearrange optimal SI -{2,3} and Sz -{5,6}.
Obviously, for all players j E N`S we have that ós(j) -vo(j)
Since ta -1 we have that Ar -{2, 3} and hence ás(3) -2 and consequently ás(2) -3.
Since tz -6 we have that Ae -{5, 6} and hence ás(5) -5 and ás(6) -6. Hence, 9s -(1,3,2,4,5,6). In sequencing situations where all ready times are equal the optimal reattangement of the grand coalition N also induces the optimal rearrangements ás of all other coalitions
S,i.e. with i, j E S it holds that ás(i) G ás(j) if and only if ár,(i) G áN(j) .
The following example shows that this need not be the case if the ready times are not equal.
Example 2 Let N -{1,2,3},00 -(1,2,3),r -(0,0,1), p- (1,1,1) and a -(1,2,3 ).
Then the optimal order of N is áN -(2,3, I) while á{z,31 -(1,3,2).
The following example shows that in case the requirement p; -1 for all i E N is dropped the above algorithm is not appropriate to obtain the optimal rearrangement. Example3 LetN-{1,2,3},vo-(1,2,3),r-(0,0,1),p-(1,2,3)anda-(1,3,12).
Then the costs w.r.t. the optimal rearrangement (1, 3, 2) are 67 while the costs w.r.t. the rearrangement (2, 3,1) that is obtained by the algorithm are 72.
The following lemma shows that in the optimal rearrangement of N the position of player na :-Qó 1(n), the last player according the initial order ao, is smaller than or equal to the position of player no in the optimal rearrangement of any tail. This implies that player no in the optimal rearrangement of N can not improve his position by joining another coalition S, since player rao is in a component of S which is a tail.
Lemma 2 Let (ao, r,p, a) be a sequencing situation with r~E N and p~-1 for all j E N. Then áN(no) G áp~;l(no) for all i E N.
PROOF: Let i E N. Suppose áN(no)~ápl;l(no).
Choose n, E N`{no} such that á~,(nl) -áFl;l(no). Since r,,, C tna,;~~r -t,,,,;N the optimality ot óN implies that an,~an,. 
QN(n3) -~F(i)(n2).
Using the same line of argument as in (a:l) and (a:2) we then find that óF~;}(no)~i f3.
We may conclude that, if óF(;)(no) -i f k with k E{1, 2, ..., n-i}, we arrive at a contradiction after k repetitions.t n the following example we show that lemma 2 need not hold for an arbitrary sequencing situation.
Example 4 Let N -{1,2,3},vo -(1,2,3),r -(0,0,4), p -(4,1,2) and a -(4,2,5). N is oN -(2,1, 3) while the optimal rearrangement of {2,3} is o{z,3} -(1,3,2). Hence aN(3) 1 o{~a}(3).
Then the optimal rearrangement of
In the next lemma we show that in the optimal rearrangement of any tail the joba írom no on are ordered in decreasing urgency.
Lemma 3 Let (vo, r,p, a) 6e a seguencing situation with r~E N and p~-1 Jor all j E N. Let i E N and k, l E N 6e such that óF(;}u{;}(no) C óF(:)u{;}(k) c óF(;)u{;}(~).
Then ak~a~.
PROOF:
Suppose ak G a~. Since r~G rno C lno,;F~;~~t,~Player k and ! can switch and decrease the h total costs of F(i) U{i}. This contradicts the optimality of óF~;}u{:}-Ñ ote that lemma 3 can be generalized to sequencing situations with no restrictiona on the ready time or processing time of a player. Then the players that follow no in the optimal rearrangement of any tail are ordered in decreasing urgency.
The following lemma shows that the optima] rearrangement àN`{"a} of N`{rto} is induced by the optimal rearrangement àN of N.
Lemma 4 Let (oo, r,p, a) be a sequencing situation such that r~E N and p~-1 for all j E N. Then àN`{,a}(k) -àN(k) if QN(k) c vN(no) and aN`{"o}(k) -~N(k) -1 if QN(k)~aN(n0).
PROOF:
Let (N`{na})i and Nt be the sets of players whose job is available at time t in determining the optimal rearrangement of N`{no} and N, respectively. For each t E{1,...,r,,, -1} Note that this propositition gives another approach to obtain the optimal order of a coalition S.
The following example shows that the result of the last lemma need not hold for an arbitrary sequencing situation.
Example5 LetN-{1,2,3},oo- (1,2,3),r-(0,0,1),p-(1,2,3)anda-(1,3,12) .
Then the optimal rearrangement of {1,2}is ( 2,1,3), but the optimal rearrangement of N is (1, 3, 2).
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The next lemma shows that, for any tail, the urgency of player k is larger than or equal to the urgency of player l if player k takes the same position in the optimal rearrangement of the tail as player l in the optimal rearrangement of N.
Lemma 5 Let (ao, r, p, a) 6e a sequencing sitnation such that r; E N and p; -1 jor all
i E N. Let i E N, k E F(i) and l E N be such that óF(;)(k) -áN(I). Then ak~a(.
PROOF:
The proof is by induction on the number of players. For~N~-2 the lemma is trivial.
Assume that for~N~C m the lemma holds. Let~N~-m. We distinguish between thrce cases.
(i) áF(~)(no) ? áF(;)(k),áN(no) 5 áN(1).
It follows that r"o C tbN.( -t;F(;),k and hence ak~a"a. Since áN(no) G áN(1) we have that a"o~a(. Hence ak 1 a(. O))~Fh)(n0) 1~Fí;)lk),QN(n0) J ON(I).
Lemma 4 yields that áN`{,b}(I) -áN(1) -áF(t)(k) -áF(;)`{,w}(k). From the induction
hypothesis it follows that ak~ar.
(iii) áF(;)(no) G áF(;)(k)
Using lemma 2 we have áN(no) C áF(;)(no) G QF(;)(k) -ál,r(I). By lemma 4 we have that áN`{"a}(l) -áN(1) -1 -áF(;)(k) -1 -QF(;)`{"o}(k). From the induction hypothesis it follows that ak 1 a(. O
An immediate consequence of lemma 5 is Corollary 1 Let (QO, r, p, a) be a sequencing situation such that r~E N and p~-1 for aU j E N. Let i E N theñ at ?~a( k: bp(')Ik)~del')(~o) i: bN(()~bpc')ln0)
4 On the convexity of sequencing games
In this section it is shown that sequencing games that correspond to sequencing situations (oo,r,p, a) with r; E N and p; -1 for all i E N are convex. First, we will give another expression of the value of a coalition S. Let vo -(il, ..., i") and assume that o;w is the optimal rearrangement of S fl (P(ik) U{ik}) within the restrict player set P(ik) U{ik}. The first equality follows by (4) and the third by lemma 4. 
PROOF:
The proof is by induction on the number of players. Obviously, if~N~-1, v is convex. Assume that for~N~G n the game v is convex. Let~N~-n.
Let i E N, S E 2N and T E 2N be such t,hat S C T C N`{i}. Wc have to prove that
(a) Suppose there exists a playcr j E N, j~i such that j~T. (5) 
If {i} is a component of TU{i} then {i} is also a component of SU{i} and, consequently, v(T U{i}) -v(T) and v(S U{i}) -n(S). So in this case
Two cases are distinguished.
(i) J -no
Then we have where the first equality follows from lemma 6 and the inequality follows from lemma 3 and corollary I.
(~)! 9 c no
The induction hypotheses implies that the game (N`{no},v~(N`{nol)) is convex. Then the convexity condition (1) with S-F(i)`{no} and T-P(j) yields
Then (7) and (i) imply
The following example shows that in general sequencing games are not necessary convex.
Exampleó LetN-{1,2,3},ao-(1,2,3),r-(0,0,1),p-(1,2,3)anda-(1,3,12). 
